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A B S T R A C T
Given the level of outsourcing, supplier performance evaluation (SPE) is a critical supply chain process. SPEs
are used to record supplier performance levels to inform future supplier selections, and thus mitigate the risk of
adverse selection. Numerous weaknesses associated with industrial buyers' collection and use of supplier perfor-
mance information call SPE effectiveness into question. The risk-related factors affecting SPE effectiveness have
not been empirically explored, including misuses of the tool. This research identifies the factors affecting SPE risk
mitigation effectiveness. It employs a mixed method of qualitative interviews of buyers and suppliers in order
to develop a model of SPE risk mitigation effectiveness using structural equations modeling of survey data from
a rare sample of 131 performance assessors. Findings implicate the importance of a thoroughly defined scope
of work, an accurate SPE, and documented rating justifications. Additionally, dissonance among several perfor-
mance evaluators and the fear of a supplier's dispute detract from SPE risk mitigation effectiveness. Finally, this
research unveils how SPEs are weaponized, pursuing short-term gains and clouding the view of the supplier's per-
formance thereby hindering the long-term, risk-mitigating purpose of SPEs. Two separate forms of opportunism -
threat and debt - are discovered and have differing effects.
1. Introduction
Given the level of outsourcing, supplier performance evaluation
(SPE) is a critical supply chain process. SPE is “the process of evalu-
ating, measuring, and monitoring supplier performance and suppliers'
business processes and practices for the purposes of reducing costs, mit-
igating risk, and driving continuous improvement” (Gordon, 2008, p.
4). Measuring supplier quality is critical since the cost of poor qual-
ity ranges from 10% to 25% of sales, and the cost of poor supplier
quality ranges from 25% to 70% of the cost of poor quality (Gordon,
2008). SPE improves buyer–supplier relationships (Prahinski & Ben-
ton, 2004; Ulaga, 2003), increases supplier performance (Prahinski
& Fan, 2007; Ulaga, 2003), and yields reductions in total supply chain
costs (Monczka, Choi, Kim, & McDowell, 2011).
SPE became popular in the 1950s (Wieters & Ostrom, 1979), and
now SPE is a ubiquitous (CAPS Research, 2011) and essential best
practice in business-to-business sourcing (Gordon, 2008). SPEs inform
future supplier selection decisions of the likelihood that a prospective
supplier will successfully perform the contract. Assessing and record-
ing performance levels and making that information available to buy
ers during a future source selection is believed to make suppliers work
harder to ensure satisfactory (or better) performance (OFPP, 2000).
SPE schemes are not without challenges. Too often, they are not
properly, timely, or accurately completed (Buffa & Ross, 2011; GAO,
2014). Reports often lack sufficient information to support ratings nec-
essary to withstand a challenge, or do not include a rating for all
performance areas (OFPP, 2011). Additionally, throughout the rating
process, raters are sometimes inclined to inflate ratings in order to
avoid conflict with the supplier (GAO, 2009). In fact, avoiding pur-
chasing dissonance in order to alleviate psychological distress appears
to be an important component of purchasing manager behavior (Gon-
zalez-Padron, Hult, & Calantone, 2008; Reilly, Saini, & Skiba,
2018). Underlying data captured in information technology systems
are sometimes flawed (Hald & Ellegaard, 2011). Masses of perfor-
mance data are condensed into more general ratings sacrificing fidelity
(Hald & Ellegaard, 2011). Buyers also commonly use multiple evalu-
ators (Buffa & Ross, 2011; Hald & Ellegaard, 2011), which invites
different perspectives on supplier performance (Hald & Ellegaard,
2011). Evaluating supplier performance is often more subjective than
might be imagined (Gordon, 2008), depending heavily on the devel
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opment of a common language and set of institutions to regulate and
adjudicate interactions (Vargo & Lusch, 2011). Thus, SPEs change
throughout the evaluation process through a negotiation process be-
tween the buyer and supplier (Hald & Ellegaard, 2011). Notwith-
standing, given the importance of SPEs to a supplier's ability to win
future business, buyers could opportunistically use SPEs as leverage to
extract concessions from suppliers – as they do in other contexts of
buyer-supplier negotiations (e.g., changes, contract formation, etc.).
Despite the fallibility of SPE schemes, there are no known studies
that quantitatively explore their degree of accuracy or susceptibility to
opportunism. Further investigation is needed in order to explore the va-
lidity of SPE processes because SPE assessments can affect key outcomes
such as future business awards, contract compliance, performance-based
payments, supplier reputation, incentive awards, and status achieve-
ment. While research has addressed the effect of SPE on supplier per-
formance, the effectiveness of SPEs in assisting buyers' future source
selection decisions is questionable (Berrios, 2006; Ulaga, 2003). In
other words, we do not know the extent to which SPEs validly build the
buyer's confidence in its assessment of the risk of doing business with a
particular supplier ex ante.
The purpose of this research is to explain the risk-related effective-
ness of SPEs and explore the extent to which the supplier performance
information collection and usage achieve the intended goals of mitigat-
ing the risk of adverse selection. The following research questions are
explored:
1. What factors contribute to the risk-related effectiveness of SPEs?
2. How are SPEs misused?
Answers to these research questions are essential because inaccurate
SPEs can harm suppliers' reputations and can bias source selection deci-
sions resulting in adverse selection. If supplier performance information
is unreliable, and if buyers and evaluators cannot use the information
to discriminate between competitive proposals (Kelman, 2010), the ef-
fort of collecting and reporting the supplier performance information is
squandered. Notwithstanding, buying organizations often use SPE infor-
mation to rank suppliers and to determine preferred supplier status. The
rankings and status are suspect if the underlying SPE ratings are not ac-
curate, resulting in the design of a less-than-optimal supply chain, and
increasing the level of psychological dissonance in purchasing profes-
sionals (Gonzalez-Padron et al., 2008; Reilly et al., 2018).
The remainder of this paper is organized in the following manner.
It begins with a brief background of SPEs and the importance of SPE
effectiveness. Then, theories relevant to SPE are summarized, namely
agency theory and organizational behavior. To explore the antecedents
of SPE risk mitigation effectiveness, this research employs qualitative
interviews of buyers and suppliers to develop a conceptual model and
testable hypotheses. Next, the study presents the methodologies of quan-
titative data collection and analysis to test the emerged model. Lastly,
discussion, limitations, implications, future research directions, and con-
clusions are offered.
2. Supplier performance evaluations
A growing body of research addresses four streams of SPE inquiry,
namely the functions of SPEs, communications, metrics, and outcomes.
First, SPEs serve several functions such as: strategy formulation and
clarification, management information, communication with suppliers
(e.g., ex ante performance expectations and ex post feedback), commu-
nications between departments, decision making and prioritizing (e.g.,
supplier selection and prioritizing supplier improvement activities), co-
ordination and alignment, motivating suppliers, continuous improve-
ment, and documenting historical performance for use in negotiations
(Schmitz & Platts, 2003; Schmitz & Platts, 2004). Importantly, SPEs
should also improve suppliers' capabilities, thereby benefit the buyer
(Hald & Ellegaard, 2011).
Second, Maestrini, Maccarrone, Caniato, and Luzzini (2018)
explore the communication of SPEs from the perspective of signal
ing theory, concentrating on information shaping, reactions from suppli-
ers, and impacts to buyer-supplier relationships. Hald and Ellegaard
(2011) also focus on communication and information exchange, high-
lighting supplier reactions and how SPE information is negotiated be-
tween buyers and suppliers.
A third stream of research concentrates on performance metrics and
measurement methods. Simpson, Siguaw, and White (2002) identify
the different metrics used in SPE. Buffa and Ross (2011) explore the
role of evaluation team diversity on supplier performance using Data En-
velopment Analysis. Cormican and Cunningham (2007) developed
an evaluation tool considering quality, on-time delivery, and total cost
of quality. Other research explores the tenets of relational exchange un-
derpinned by social network theory (Granovetter, 1985). Cousins,
Lawson, and Squire (2008) examined how the role of socialization
mechanisms in the SPE process affected buyer performance. Giannakis
(2007) developed a framework for a SPE method that evaluates sup-
plier relational constructs such as trust, commitment, power, and in-
volvement.
Finally, a body of research focuses on the outcomes of SPEs. Man-
agers have strong perceptions that SPE can lead to several benefits (e.g.,
Hald & Ellegaard, 2011; Handfield, Cousins, Lawson, & Petersen,
2015; Nair, Jayaram, & Das, 2015). The use of an SPM system im-
proves buyer–supplier relationships (Prahinski & Benton, 2004), im-
proves supplier performance (Schmitz & Platts, 2004), and increases
frequency and content of feedback, which also increases supplier perfor-
mance (Handfield & Nichols Jr, 2004; Nair et al., 2015; Prahin-
ski & Fan, 2007). Additionally, the use of a performance evaluation
program increases the strength of the relationship between suppliers'
process innovativeness and the buyer's performance benefits (Azade-
gan, 2011). In one industry benchmark, use of an SPM system garnered
10% greater price savings, 12% better on-time delivery improvement,
four times greater quality improvement, and 4% greater improvement
in service (Aberdeen Group, 2005). SPM enables continuous improve-
ments that can yield a 3% to 6% reduction in total supply chain costs
via continuous improvements (Gordon, 2008).
Industrial marketing research extols the role of monitoring in order
to manage the hazards of exchange, specifically, supplier opportunism
ex post and adverse selection ex ante (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997).
SPE serves both purposes by measuring supplier performance and by
serving as a repository of performance information for future source se-
lections. While SPEs have many post-contractual uses as previously de-
scribed, we limit the focus of this research to the effectiveness of SPEs
in mitigating the risk of adverse selection to coincide with the problems
identified and the research questions. Otherwise, attempting to address
all of the functions of SPEs would require many more explanatory fac-
tors in the model compromising the executability of the study.
SPE risk mitigation effectiveness represents the extent to which SPEs
achieve the goal of mitigating the risk of unsuccessful contract perfor-
mance (i.e., avoiding adverse selection). SPEs mitigate risk by informing
future buying teams of a prospective supplier's true past performance
levels. While context-specific implementation and theoretical perspec-
tives publish fairly frequently, especially case studies of new supplier
evaluation methods (e.g., Hu, Chiu, Yen, & Cheng, 2015; Zeydan,
Çolpan, & Çobanoğlu, 2011), empirical validations of benefits are
scarce (Maestrini et al., 2018). Furthermore, the mechanisms for cap-
turing and measuring performance levels are not well understood, espe-
cially in relation to the effects of opportunism.
Our research, and prior research, alludes to the misuse of SPEs (Hald
& Ellegaard, 2011). We define SPE misuse as the use of SPEs in im-
proper, unforeseeable, or unintended manners. Business research has
a history of highlighting the dangers of misuse, for instance in con-
sumer misuse of products (e.g., Trombetta & Wilson, 1975), in insti-
tutional misuse of personal information (e.g., Young & Quan-Haase,
2013), and in employee misuse of information technology resources
(e.g., D'Arcy & Devaraj, 2012). SPE misuse inherently involves op-
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not proper, foreseen or anticipated, and that ultimately erode SPE effi-
ciency and effectiveness at accurately evaluating supplier behavior.
3. Theoretical foundation and hypothesis development
3.1. Multi-theoretical approach
Inter-organizational behavior is a complex phenomenon such that
any single theory falls short of explaining the many interrelationships.
A review of supply chain literature revealed 180 distinct theories used
to direct inquiry and understand the domain (Defee, Williams, Ran-
dall, & Thomas, 2010). SPE's complexity emerges from the interaction
of individual human actors nested in organizational structures, and due
to the intersection of multiple disciplines such as contract law, supply
chain management, and marketing. An SPE system is an organizational
adaptive mechanism that suffers the problems of agency arising from
the managers both internal and external to the firm in the supplier eval-
uation process (Schmitz & Platts, 2004). Due to its emergence from
both the organizational and agent levels, we apply two theories: organi-
zational behavior and agency theory.
Blending organizational behavior and agency theory is characteris-
tic of the field of organizational economics (OE) (Barney & Ouchi,
1986). OE focuses on the relationships between suppliers and buyers,
especially the question of what information is gathered and how it is
used (Gibbons & Roberts, 2013). Our research falls in the same vein
as other buyer-supplier research connecting the inter-organizational and
inter-personal levels (i.e., Ashnai, Henneberg, Naudé, & Frances-
cucci, 2016).
OE applies agency theory to study transactions occurring within
firms with a special focus on the problem of the shirking and deceit of
managers entrusted to protect the interests of the firm versus the man-
agers of the supplying firms (Donaldson, 1990). As a body of empir-
ical and theoretical work, OE presents a stream of organizational be-
havior literature explaining why some organizations outperform oth-
ers based upon their ability to manage both internal and supplier re-
lationships efficiently (Barney & Hesterly, 2006). Incorporating an
organizational-level theory shores up agency theory research that suf-
fers “misplaced methodological individualism” (Worsham, Eisner, &
Ringquist, 1997, p. 423) where large organizations of many people
and sub-organizations are assumed to act as one homogeneous entity.
OE explains the need to monitor and control opportunism as much
for internal as external managers by viewing organizational behavior
in the context of conducting exchanges of goods and services as a con-
tinuously evolving process guided by the agents' (internal and external
managers') drive to do so in the most efficient manner. Williamson is ar-
guably OE's most famous proponent, and his Nobel citation recognized
the implications of his work going beyond his famous transaction cost
analysis to bring together economics, organization theory, and contract
law, with transaction costs as his most famous explanatory mechanism
for assessing intra- and inter-firm efficiency, and especially the effects of
opportunism such as shirking, and deceit (Combs & Ketchen Jr, 1999;
Donaldson, 1990). Contractual relations engage authority and incen-
tives not available in open market transactions in order to manage diver-
gent goals, imperfect information, and self-interest (Combs & Ketchen
Jr, 1999; Williamson, 1975), and effective SPEs contribute to these
goals.
Although contracts and organizations create the environment and
the processes for SPEs, organizations are constituted of individuals and
it would be an error to attribute every positive or negative outcome
to the organizational or environmental context (Luthans & Youssef,
2007). Where organizational behavior examines organizational adap-
tations, agency theory elucidates situations when individuals make de-
cisions on behalf of others, and like SPEs, agency theory's usual unit
of analysis is the contract (Eisenhardt, 1989). The contract demon-
strates the added complexity of an agent monitoring an agent—the per-
formance evaluator acts as an agent in the employ of the organization,
and the supplier is a contractually obligated agent. Asymmetries in in
formation can lead either or both agents to shirk duties, distort informa-
tion, and behave opportunistically. For example, when rating a sub-par
supplier, rather than rate the supplier as unsatisfactory, the evaluator
might inflate the rating to avoid a dispute. Principals can respond by in-
creasing monitoring of agents (although aligning the goals of the agent
with the principal is a less costly approach), manifesting as long-term
employment and, for suppliers, using outcome-based contracts (Eisen-
hardt, 1989). Principals also screen potential supplier agents ex ante to
mitigate adverse selection.
Because these are organizational and agent-level phenomena, our hy-
pothesis development describes the context of the circumstances of our
sample setting of government purchasing. The circumstances of govern-
ment contracting may vary in detail, but we observe similar circum-
stances in the for-profit setting (Beausoleil, 2010).
3.2. Rating dissonance
SPE is complex; there may be multiple internal stakeholders and
organizations, multiple supplier personnel, multiple performance crite-
ria, and multiple performance evaluators involved (Hald & Ellegaard,
2011; Maestrini et al., 2018; Nair et al., 2015; Palmatier, 2008;
Shapiro, 2005; Wieters & Ostrom, 1979), especially with large, com-
plex contracts and where performance occurs in more than one loca-
tion. Evidence of the benefit of reducing organizational dissonance can
be found in supply chain integration research. Firm internal integration
reinforces external supply chain integration which, in turn, improves
supply chain performance (Frohlich & Westbrook, 2001; Huo, 2012;
Leuschner, Rogers, & Charvet, 2013).
Dissonance can arise from psychological factors at the agent-level.
Affective trait diversity on the source selection team has recently been
found to diminish performance of sourcing teams, and sourcing team
cohesion fully mediated this effect, demonstrating the importance of
reducing dissonance and reconciling diverse sourcing team members
(Kaufmann & Wagner, 2017). Dissonance can also be seen in the
negative effect of geographic dispersion on buyer-supplier relationship
performance that increases with the intensity of information sharing
(Lorentz, Töyli, Solakivi, Hälinen, & Ojala, 2012), findings mir-
rored in international trade (Disdier & Head, 2008).
Rating dissonance represents one component of information integra-
tion in supply chains (Frohlich & Westbrook, 2001). Organizational
behaviorists have researched dissonance among multiple raters in the
context of the employee performance appraisal system (e.g., 360-degree
evaluations in which superiors, subordinates, and peers evaluate the ra-
tee). Using multiple raters can offer more unique, valuable information
about the employee's performance and may mitigate evaluation bias
(Brown, Inceoglu, & Lin, 2017; Levy, Cawley, & Foti, 1998; van
der Heijden & Nijhof, 2004). More fairness comes at the cost of vari-
ance in ratings attributable to individual differences in raters (Brown
et al., 2017; Mount, Judge, Scullen, Sytsma, & Hezlett, 1998).
Notwithstanding, a rich research stream touts the benefits of functional
conflict - specifically task conflict (Jehn & Chatman, 2000) - which
facilitates challenges to ideas and open dialogue. Managed correctly,
such disagreements improve decision-making and increase performance
(Jehn & Chatman, 2000).
In the context of SPEs, friction results from the organization concate-
nating insights from different evaluators, different instances of supplier
performance, and different interpretations of the meaning of perfor-
mance criteria and rating definitions (Dowst, 1972; Korschun, 2015;
Levy et al., 1998). More raters mean more complexity to input ratings
and assessments, and more opportunity for suppliers to successfully re-
but ratings and to offset relatively minor failures with successes, garner-
ing an overall acceptable rating. An increased ability to escape a rating
unscathed diminishes motivation to improve performance, and reduces
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With both beneficial and detrimental effects, it is likely that disso-
nance affects SPE efficacy; however, it is not feasible to predict exactly
how. Therefore:
H1aThere will be a negative relationship between rating dissonance
and SPE risk mitigation effectiveness.
H1bThere will be a positive relationship between rating dissonance
and SPE risk mitigation effectiveness.
3.3. Rating justification and perceived accuracy
In performance appraisal, suppliers will more willingly accept nega-
tive feedback based on detailed, thought-out communication and clearly
identified initiatives and improvements (Maestrini et al., 2018). Jus-
tifications include the supporting details and facts surrounding the eval-
uated performance, applying both mediated and non-mediated (refer-
ent, expert) bases of power to create an ethical buyer-supplier climate
(Schleper, Blome, & Wuttke, 2017). Fact-based substantiation and
commitment to an ethical climate give credence to the rating and give
confidence to the future source selection team that the SPE informa-
tion is providing true insights into the prospective supplier's past per-
formance. Rating justification describes when the source selection team
is armed with the facts to support their ratings and to defend them to
senior leaders or even against unsuccessful offerors in a legal challenge
to a contract award decision (e.g., a bid protest in government procure-
ment).
No matter how well justified, perceived accuracy of SPEs depends on
several factors. Buying organizations that cannot muster the evidence
to justify a rating, or opt not to bother, diminish accuracy. Inaccura-
cies also creep into SPEs in ways that demonstrate striking parallels to
employee performance appraisal. Affective constraints limit the amount
of agreement between a supervisor's rating and a ratees' self-evaluation
due to the tendency of individuals to confirm a role in successful per-
formance while attributing failure to external factors (Campbell & Lee,
1988; Deb, Li, & Mukherjee, 2016). In the context of organizational
buying, failures of the procurement program could be unreasonably at-
tributed to a supplier's performance.
At other times, the employee or supervisor willfully gives an in-
accurate appraisal, perhaps in order to preserve the effectiveness of
an interdependent work group (Campbell & Lee, 1988; Korschun,
2015). Academic literature confirms that a halo effect occurs in SPEs
and could partially explain inflated ratings (Kelman, 2010), and the
same concern has been identified in employee performance appraisals
that demonstrate similar traits of multiple raters and inflated ratings
(Erez, Schilpzand, Leavitt, Woolum, & Judge, 2015; Thomas &
Bretz, 1994). In another situation that occurs in the supplier relation-
ship context, supplier self-evaluations may become biased if a supplier
seeks to preserve its reputation; deliberate dishonesty is more likely to
occur when self-appraisals are used for scarce resource allocation deci-
sions (Shrauger & Osberg, 1981; Steinle, Schiele, & Ernst, 2014),
such as contract awards.
Distressed suppliers may refute any negative information, challeng-
ing the rating and justification, increasing workload for the buying or-
ganization to resolve disagreements. If the supplier's performance did
not meet requirements, rather than rate the supplier as unsatisfactory,
the evaluator might inflate the rating to avoid a dispute—conflict that
would unveil the evaluator's negligence.
In sum, SPE systems with deficient ratings justification and perceived
accuracy disincentivize suppliers and fail to reduce the risk of adverse
selection by a future buyer (Maestrini et al., 2018). Perceiving a de-
ficient system, evaluators will fail to engage in detailed, factual rating
justification that will be accepted by the supplier and, if rebutted, inter-
nally by a reviewing official. Thus, it is posited that:
H2There is a positive relationship between perceived accuracy and
rating justification.
H3There will be a positive relationship between rating justification and
SPE risk mitigation effectiveness.
3.4. Supplier disputes
Perceived unfairness has been labeled as inter-firm “relationship poi-
son”, and while contracts suppress problems of opportunism they exac-
erbate the sense of unfairness due to attribution at the agent-level of
negative motivations to the evaluator (Samaha, Palmatier, & Dant,
2011). This mirrors organizational behavior research about how a ra-
tee will respond to feedback in a way that corresponds to his or her
acceptance of the feedback: “employees are unlikely to accept, desire
to respond, or intend to respond to feedback based on information de-
rived from an invalid or inaccurate appraisal” (Kinicki, Prussia, Mc-
Kee-Ryan, & Wu, 2004, p. 1067). The emergence of due process in
employee performance evaluation is testament to the importance of a
fair hearing (i.e., an appeal process) and that judgment be based on evi-
dence (i.e., be accurate) (Folger, Konovsky, & Cropanzano, 1992).
In government contracting, ratings are entered into an information
system by assessing officials – those appointed to oversee supplier per-
formance (e.g., quality inspectors). The frequency of evaluation varies
by contract, but typically, an evaluation occurs within 120 days of the
completion of performance (e.g., delivery of goods or completion of a
term for services). The information system transmits the evaluation to
the supplier. Suppliers are afforded an opportunity to respond to the
evaluations. Disagreements are decided by a reviewing official who serves
at least one level above the assessing official. Final reports are again
shared with the supplier.
Disputed ratings generate efforts to justify the original ratings (Beau-
soleil, 2010). Rebuttals often occur in SPEs in for-profit organizations
as well (Hald & Ellegaard, 2011); a supplier may leverage a man-
ager-level relationship with the buyer to communicate disagreement
with SPEs. Any rebuttals require that the buying organization develop
internal explanations, expend effort to muster facts, and deal with neg-
ative attention if the original SPE was not accurate or properly justi-
fied. Fear of a supplier dispute can result when attempts among multiple
raters to thwart a supplier rebuttal generate internal conflict, which may
motivate some evaluators to inflate ratings—and diminish ratings accu-
racy—to avoid a dispute, while others may take a legalistic, strict ap-
proach. Given the above logic, it is hypothesized that:
H4The lower the perceived accuracy, the greater the fear of supplier
dispute.
H5There will be a positive relationship between fear of supplier dis-
pute and rating dissonance.
3.5. Sufficiency of requirement definition
Buyer expectations of suppliers must be communicated to suppli-
ers. This often occurs via a requirements document such as a statement
of work, a specification, or drawings. Purchasers of goods and services
should clearly define their requirements (i.e., expectations) to achieve
procurement objectives (Van der Valk & Rozemeijer, 2009). This is
among the most difficult tasks in the sourcing process (Van der Valk
& Rozemeijer, 2009). Reports highlight several instances of decreased
contract outcomes due to inadequately defined requirements (GAO,
2002; GAO, 2007; GAO, 2009). These persistent problems illuminate
the problems of agency. Defying conventional wisdom, buyer teams fail
to apply the requisite due diligence to develop and provide complete
and accurate specifications of needs. Without a complete understanding
of the buyer's requirement, a supplier may not perform work that the
buyer expects to receive and may not meet the buyer's expectations in
terms of function, performance, and quality (Hawkins & Muir, 2014).
Logically, if the work is not well defined, evaluators will struggle to ac-
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Therefore, is it posited that:
H6There will be a positive relationship between the sufficiency of
the requirement definition and perceived accuracy.
3.6. Opportunism attitudes
Central to agency theory is the assumption of opportunism, defined
as self-interest seeking with guile (Williamson, 1975). Opportunism
constitutes a litany: stealing, cheating, breach of contract, dishonesty,
distorting data, obfuscating issues, and misrepresentation (Anderson,
1988; John, 1984; Wathne & Heide, 2000; Williamson, 1981,
1987, 1993). It is so commonplace that textbooks describe oppor-
tunistic negotiation techniques such as phantom offers, escalation, the
switch, silence (Monczka, Trent, & Handfield, 2002), artificial legal
leverage, the missing person, stalling (Cavinato & Kauffman, 2000),
and bluffing.
Where the positive aspects of trust and long-term relational orienta-
tion have enjoyed research attention, little research has assessed the op-
portunistic manner in which buyers can take advantage of their impor-
tant role in the buyer-supplier setting (Schoenherr et al., 2012), and
even fewer works have assessed opportunism in the context of SPE mis-
use. Hald and Ellegaard (2011) studied SPE's in their design, imple-
mentation, and use phases, and identified 13 factors that shape supplier
performance information. Their work found potential misuse by the sup-
pliers at the implementation phase, and by both suppliers and buyers at
the use phase.
The misuses resulted from amplifying effects at the implementation
stage, and from dampening and directing effects at the use stage. Ampli-
fication resulted when buyers added or dosed information to provoke a
behavioral change—behavior that left suppliers feeling treated unfairly
and demotivated. Dampening is a withdrawal behavior involving reduc-
tion of a past amplification in order to restore goodwill, but it may drive
supplier doubts in the SPE, thereby reducing their effectiveness. Direct-
ing defines the effect of re-routing SPE information to influence who
will receive it, or blocking or hindering information from reaching its
intended audience.
Dependence is the predominant factor affecting opportunism
(Hawkins, Wittmann, & Beyerlein, 2008; Tangpong, Li, & Hung,
2016; Wang & Yang, 2013). Empirical research finds variable impacts
on trust from different forms of buyer opportunism. Hill, Eckerd, Wil-
son, and Greer (2009) distinguished subtle and deceitful unethical be-
haviors, finding that even if the supplier benefits from buyer unethical
behavior that trust erodes—a supplier dependent on a buyer untrustwor-
thy in one dimension would understandably exhibit less trust in other
dimensions of the relationship, such as SPEs.
The extremely high switching costs of engaging in government con-
tracting also create dependence of buyers on suppliers. The oft-used sole
source contract increases buyer dependence (and supplier power). In or-
der to counter dependence, buyers may weaponize the SPE as leverage
to reap concessions from suppliers. The practice of a buyer threaten-
ing to downgrade a supplier's performance rating unless a particular ac-
tion (or inaction) is conceded (Schmitz & Platts, 2004) constitutes de-
ceitful psychological contract violation (Hill et al., 2009) hereafter re-
ferred to as opportunism-threat. This opportunism manifestation is misus-
ing SPEs for coercion by withholding rewards (of a deserved more fa-
vorable SPE) versus by levying punishment (Molm, 1997; Saini, 2010;
Tangpong et al., 2016).
Past research demonstrates that where breaches of relational expec-
tations can be somewhat overlooked when attributed to environmen-
tal circumstances beyond buyer control such as a disruption, when at-
tributed to reneging such behavior particularly damages trust (Eckerd,
Hill, Boyer, Donohue, & Ward, 2013), and reduced trust erodes
supplier confidence in the buyer's performance evaluation process. The
subjective nature of many performance evaluation schemes (Gor
don, 2008) provide buyers ample latitude to conclude performance as
acceptable or not.
On the other hand, a less-than-desirable performance rating may be
warranted, but a buyer may be willing to compromise the long-term
value of the SPE (i.e., the ability to inform a future source selection) by
inflating the rating in exchange for near-term concessions on the current
contract (Husser, Gautier, André, & Lespinet-Najib, 2014; Tang-
pong et al., 2016). Where ratings are subtly bargained for concessions,
the accuracy of SPEs could be questioned. Therefore, it is posited that:
H7Opportunism Attitude-Threat will be negatively related to per-
ceived accuracy.
Opportunism in SPEs could take another form. In a situation that
supplier performance warrants a ‘poor’ SPE rating, fear of a supplier dis-
pute to the rating would be high because suppliers often will attempt
to challenge any information deleterious to its reputation – whether the
basis of the challenge is true or not (Maestrini et al., 2018). To avoid
confrontation, the buyer can award an obviously more positive SPE than
deserved. This ‘gift’ is an SPE misuse that could create a subtle debt
and activate the norm of reciprocity (Greenberg, 1980; Tangpong et
al., 2016). The long time horizon and mutual buyer-seller dependence
means that the buyer can expect a return favor in the future, effec-
tively supplanting the written contract with a psychological one forged
by promises between individual agents (Kingshott, 2006). This can
dilute accountability between the buyer and supplier, and re-purposes
trust from benefiting organizations in order to benefit individual agents
(Husser et al., 2014; Saini, 2010).
We refer to this as opportunism-debt. The theory of indebtedness
(Gouldner, 1960) suggests that debts can create negative emotions
such as discomfort, uneasiness, and avoidance mechanisms. Debts re-
strain freedom potentially leading to reactance (Pelser et al., 2015).
This sort of subtle unethical behavior has been found to increase the
sense of psychological contract violation in empirical supply chain re-
search (Hill et al., 2009), and such behavior negatively impacts per-
ceptions of fairness (Eckerd et al., 2013). Even in the context of a
trusting and transparent relationship without intentional opportunistic
intentions, buyers imposing an obligation that exceeds supplier's willing-
ness or capabilities to reciprocate is a misuse of an SPE that erodes trust
(Day, Fawcett, Fawcett, & Magnan, 2013); negative attributions of
buyer motivations would erode trust even further (Eckerd et al., 2013;
Hill et al., 2009).
Suppliers may attempt to break free from the indebtedness by chal-
lenging the premise that the SPE is overly-favorable. The buyer may fear
that the supplier, in its rebuttal – which becomes an official record –
will explicitly call out the buyer's opportunistic attempt to gain power
via the tactic of indebtedness. A supplier can share its experience with
other clients and suppliers, potentially tarnishing the reputation of the
offending buyer. A rebuttal creates more effort to reconcile the conflict,
and unveiled favors with strings attached may become embarrassing if
revealed. Therefore, it is posited that:
H8Opportunism Attitude-Debt will be positively related to fear of
supplier dispute.
The conceptual model (Fig. 1) displays this set of hypotheses to ex-
plain SPE risk mitigation effectiveness. The model integrates organiza-
tional theory and agency theory to offer explanations for the mecha-
nisms leading to the risk-related effectiveness of SPEs.
4. Methodology
This research employs a mixed method. First, interviews of buy-
ers and suppliers serve to validate the conceptual model of hypothe-
ses suggested by practice and supported by theory (i.e., research ques-
tion 1). Next, the interviews were used to explore whether and how
SPEs are used opportunistically. Following the qualitative model build-
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Fig. 1. Model of SPE risk mitigation effectiveness.
SPEs from a rare sample of performance evaluators in order to test the
hypotheses.
The context selected for the study was contract performance between
U.S. federal government agencies and their suppliers. A government
context was suitable due to its massive scope (i.e., dollars, industries,
and geographies), rigor, established fairness, and standardized SPE pro-
cedures. The U.S. government has a uniform policy of SPE data collec-
tion and use, and uses standard ratings. SPE data is considered propri-
etary or is otherwise sensitive; many for-profit firms have policies pro-
hibiting the release of the information. Taken together, the government
context offered opportunity to explore large, complex contracts while
controlling for bias and systematic sources of variance.
4.1. Qualitative
Interviews were conducted separately with performance evaluators
and suppliers. The interview protocols (Tables 2 and 4) were devel-
oped based on a review of archival SPEs, the literature surrounding SPE,
and discussions with academic experts and practitioners. Eight inter-
views of performance evaluators were conducted. Each interview was
recorded and then transcribed, lasting between 38 and 67 min (mean
of 51 min). Transcripts averaging 18 pages and 7394 words in length
were then sent to informants for an accuracy check, enhancing construct
validity (Flint, Woodruff, & Gardial, 2002; Yin, 2009). The sample
of performance evaluators (Table 1) was drawn from the researcher's
personal contacts within one military service. Employees who routinely
evaluate contractor performance participated. Experience in evaluating
contractor performance ranged from two to 28 years, and there was a
similar wide range of the number of SPEs experienced (1–50).
Eight interviews were conducted with suppliers. The interviews
lasted between 32 and 65 min, and all were recorded and then tran-
scribed except for two at the request of the informants. Transcripts av-
eraged 13.5 pages in length. One interview occurred in-person, five oc-
curred via telephone, and two informants provided only written testi-
mony. The sample of supplier informants (Table 2) was identified from
awarded contracts exceeding $150 thousand and from contacts made at
a trade association annual conference. Input from representatives of fed-
eral contractors who had been directly involved in the SPE process was
sought. The perspectives of large and small businesses representing mul-
tiple industries were obtained. Experience in managing customer evalu-
ations ranged from three to 34 years, and there was a similar wide range
of the number of SPEs experienced (12–50).
The analysis process began by identifying constructs, defining those
constructs, and then positing relationships between them (Van Ecke,
Skouma, Freund, Goeskjaer, & Ooms, 2006). Each interview was ex-
amined to identify themes and then tested to determine whether these
themes remained consistent in subsequent interviews or in reexamina-
tions of previous interviews. Tables 3 and 4 show relevant summaries
of testimonies and informant quotes, then identify associated constructs
from the conceptual model. The relationships among constructs in the
conceptual model were supported by the interview data.
4.2. Quantitative
The quantitative methodology entailed measuring constructs via sur-
vey. The unit of analysis was a buying organization's SPE. Existing
scales with established reliability and validity were used where possi-
ble (Appendix A). Measures were created for constructs with no exist
Table 1
Informant demographics – performance evaluators.
Informant Civilian/military Industry Experience (Years) Role Past performance experience (number of evaluations)
1 Civilian Aerospace 28 Contracting Officer 50+
2 Military Aerospace 7 Program Manager 10
3 Civilian IT 4 Program Manager 11
4 Civilian IT 10 Program Manager 7
5 Military IT 10 Program Manager 5
6 Military IT 9 Program Manager 15
7 Military IT 2 Program Manager 1
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Table 2
Informant demographics – suppliers.
Informant Business size Industry




1 L Aerospace 34 Systems Engineer Multiple
2 L Aerospace 7 Program Manager 50
3 L Aerospace 14 Program Manager Multiple
4 S Information Technology 3 COO
5 L Munitions 4 VP, Business Development 12
6 L Aerospace 30 VP, Business Strategy 50
7 L Aerospace Multiple Contracts Director 24
8 S Shipbuilding 30 President 30+
ing scales based on the literature and on comments from performance
evaluators and suppliers. New scales were used to measure SPE risk miti-
gation effectiveness, rating dissonance, rating justification, opportunism
attitude-threat, opportunism-debt, and fear of supplier dispute.
4.2.1. Perceived accuracy
Perceived accuracy was measured by expounding on a scale devel-
oped by Kinicki et al. (2004) that assessed the accuracy of employee
performance appraisals. Key aspects of accuracy included being consis-
tent and being factual. Informants reported the importance of factual
evaluations since a supplier's future business could depend on the SPEs.
They also confirmed the halo effect (Erez et al., 2015); supplier evalu-
ations are commonly inaccurate due to inflated ratings. Informants also
expressed concern about inconsistent SPEs due to the human factor and
the inherent subjectivity of ratings. Therefore, two items each were used
to measure these two aspects.
4.2.2. Sufficiency of requirement definition
An existing, four-item scale was used to measure the sufficiency
of requirement definition (Hawkins, Berkowitz, Muir, & Gravier,
2015). Requirements (i.e., needs) are commonly communicated in vari-
ous documents such as contracts, purchase orders, specifications, draw-
ings, and statements of work; thus, several scale items prompted respon-
dents to consider these documents to indicate how well the requirements
were defined. Often, these documents are not perfect (Lam, Chin, &
Pun, 2007). Ambiguities in the wording can lead to uncertainty in
meaning. Thus, one item was included to gauge the presence of ambigu-
ities.
4.2.3. Rating dissonance
This construct gauges the degree of disagreement among multiple
performance evaluators of a supplier's performance level. As evidenced
in the interview testimonies, consternation can envelop ratings and nar-
rative explanations of the ratings. Thus, three scale items addressed
these two potential points of disagreement. Consistent with prior op-
erationalization of disagreement (Lovelace, Shapiro, & Weingart,
2001), scale items asked respondents to indicate the amount of dis-
agreement and lack of consensus.
4.2.4. Rating justification
Behavioral decision-making research emphasizes the important role
of reasoning in choices (Kuo & Nakhata, 2016). As such, rating justi-
fication addresses the extent to which the evaluation was explained and
warranted. Justification taps an important aspect of SPE, acceptance of
feedback (Ilgen, Fisher, & Taylor, 1979). Buyers (i.e., raters) want
suppliers (ratees) to accept the evaluation in order to avoid conflict and
motivate them to appropriately act on the feedback. In the context of
SPEs – and unique to a buyer-supplier context – the buying organiza-
tion also needs future buyers to accept the feedback. Acceptance by fu-
ture buyers enables trust in the information, and thus, buyers can con-
fidently rely on (i.e., act upon) evaluations that are explained and sup
ported with evidence. Decision justification has been operationalized
as easy to defend (i.e., evidence) and logical (i.e., explained and ratio-
nalized) (Kuo & Nakhata, 2016). These key aspects of justification
emerged in the interviews; thus, two scale items were included to assess
the extent of explanation of the ratings, and one item addressed the ex-
tent of evidence to support the SPE.
4.2.5. Opportunism
Interviews with performance evaluators and suppliers revealed op-
portunistic tendencies among evaluators. The willingness to use the
threat of a low SPE to evoke a desired response from a supplier (referred
to as opportunism attitude – threat) was measured by two items. One item
assessed the acceptability of threatening a supplier using the SPE rating,
while the other item assessed the acceptability of using the SPE as lever-
age. The willingness to award an overly-favorable SPE with the expec-
tation that the favor will be repaid (referred to as opportunism attitude
– debt) was measured by two items. The first item gauged the expec-
tation of reciprocating. The second item assessed the evaluator's belief
that leverage can be gained through gifting an inflated SPE.
4.2.6. Fear of supplier dispute
This construct emerged from the interviews as a consideration affect-
ing the content of SPEs. Scale items assessed the likelihood of the sup-
plier disputing its SPE, the buyer's degree of concern over such a rebut-
tal, and the ensuing effort required to resolve the dispute.
4.2.7. SPE risk mitigation effectiveness
Since the purpose of SPEs is to mitigate the risk of adverse selec-
tion, gauging the ability of the SPE to assess the risk of unsuccessful sup-
plier performance ex ante is essential. The developed scale included two
items to assess such risk. Inherent in the definition of risk is uncertainty
(Bettman, 1973) – an aspect that emerged from the interviews. There-
fore, one scale item was used to elicit respondent's consideration of the
uncertainty of supplier performance. Given the purpose of the SPE to re-
duce information asymmetry between buyers and prospective suppliers
during a future source selection, we added a scale item that gauges the
buyer's confidence level in its assessment of potential supplier risk.
As a pre-test, several academicians and contracting practitioners
reviewed the survey instrument. Feedback was solicited regarding
whether the survey items: (1) captured the domain of the construct (con-
tent validity), (2) were unambiguous, (3) were simple to understand,
and (4) were consistently interpretable (Dillman, 2000). The experts
were asked whether the model was sufficiently comprehensive, and it
was modified based upon expert feedback.
In an effort to ensure construct reliability and validity prior to
full-scale survey deployment (Churchill Jr., 1979), the survey in-
strument was pilot-tested via online survey to 265 performance eval-
uators, with 41 responses received. Internal consistency reliability for
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Table 3
Structured interview questionnaire – performance evaluators.
Question, Response Summaries, and Quotes Construct
Are past performance reports useful? How so, or why not?
• “I think it could be effective at mitigating a risk if the require-
ments that you are looking at match up with the [inaudible]
past performance evaluations that you are comparing them
to.”
• “I know that it is going to be watered down kind of like the
[enlisted performance report/officer performance report] be-
cause there is so much pressure that the contractor puts back
on the government for wording intricacies. Overall, I think I
would have to question the overall overarching fairness of the
process just because just like the [enlisted performance report/
officer performance report] system, particularly the [officer
performance report] system you question how much reality
you are getting out of this if you are not seeing all of these
support that goes behind the ratings. That is why I would have








In the cases of multiple evaluators on a single contract action, do past
performance evaluations/ratings deviate among evaluators, and, if so,
why?
• “Sometimes there was some real consternation, and sometimes
they actually went outside the program team and went up to
higher management to get it resolved.”
• The informants offered a variety of explanations for differ-
ences in assessments. Three informants mentioned different ex-
pectations of contractor performance and poor requirements
definition as culprits. Two informants attributed incongruent
past performance evaluations to insufficient monitoring of the
contractor. Two informants mentioned that the different gov-
ernment performance evaluators had different experiences,
suggesting that individual differences may exist. Two infor-
mants mentioned different locations of the contracting officer's
representative, indicating that performance may differ at dif-
ferent physical sites. Two informants also mentioned that work
overload precludes performance evaluators from fulfilling their








To what extent do past performance evaluations/ratings captured in
federal databases influence source selection decisions?
• One informant reported no influence. Three informants re-
ported little influence. One informant reported some influence,
and one informant reported great influence.
SPE
Effectiveness
Why do past performance evaluations/ratings lack sufficient
justification/supporting information?
• “I was working on another project completely different from
this and couldn't even spell [SPE]. I mean I didn't really know
what it was and all of a sudden I was made the program man-
ager for a certain—for a program.” “So my first one was—and
I don't even remember what the ratings were—I really don't,
but I know that first one, that was probably—I am not going to
say it was wrong, but I am going to say it was—I couldn't have
backed up some of the stuff that was in there because I wasn't
working with the contractor.”
• “And there is a wide variety within the system, in my experi-
ence. So you get—and you find that out by calling back to the
PMs that you can get ahold of, if they are still there. The older
the [SPEs] are, obviously it is harder to find the people, and








Question, Response Summaries, and Quotes Construct
Why are past performance evaluations sometimes inaccurate?
• “That is very hard to get an under satisfactory from what I
have seen.”
• “Many—in my opinion, many of the ratings for a long time
could have been a lot lower if government had its act together
and adequately supported and communicated with the con-
tractor.”
• “Some services tend to not put much negative information in
there in my experience. At least the ones I have read. Some of
them are written more like a performance report where it's
bad to say anything negative. I think that—if that is the ap-
proach that people take, then you would take then the system
has little value.”
• “There were other things that were like, well, they didn't per-
form as well as we wanted them to, but we couldn't ding them
on it because nowhere in the contract did it specifically say
this is your standard and this is where you have to meet it or
exceed it.”
• “So we work hard in this division to have the evidence within
the [SPE] so it doesn't get disputed down the road if we run
into issues.”
• “Actually it didn't even get disputed, and we had a couple of
areas where we had a few markdowns and we had the data,
















ing reliabilities greater than 0.7 for established scales and greater than
0.6 for new scales (Hair, Black, & Babin, 2010).
An online survey was then presented to 2247 additional performance
evaluators. Out of 148 responses received, 58 were incomplete result-
ing in 90 usable responses. Since no changes were made to the survey
from the pilot study, the records from the pilot study were added to
the data set1 resulting in a combined sample of 131 respondents out of
2512 and an overall response rate of 5.2%. This response rate, while
low, is comparable to that of other supply chain research that combined
samples (Gimenez & Sierra, 2013) and other studies of public pro-
curement, a population that is difficult to access (Saastamoinen, Rei-
jonen, & Tammi, 2017; Tammi, Saastamoinen, & Reijonin, 2014). The
response rate is also similar to previous studies in marketing research
(e.g. Lages, Silva, & Styles, 2009; Morgan & Hunt, 1994; Prior,
2012; Prior, 2016). Due to the sensitivity of SPEs, the survey data is
difficult to obtain and, therefore, extraordinarily rare. No other study
that we are aware of exists that captures quantitative data of supplier
evaluations of multiple suppliers from multiple buy-side evaluators of
post-contract-award performance.
4.3. Demographics
Demographics characterizing the respondents and the contracts for
which they responded are found in Table 5. The average dollar value
of the contracts was $164.7 million (std. dev. $971.8 M; range:
$62 K-$10B). The respondents' average years of experience assessing
contractor performance was 14.75 (std. dev. 9.5). The sample was re-
spectably educated. Performance evaluators represented a variety of
job functions. Respondent ages were evenly distributed across ten-year
groups. Most respondents were male (72%), which is somewhat skewed
compared to total U.S. government employment (57%) (Office of Per-
sonnel Management, 2014). The sample was influenced by services
versus construction and goods, but a wide variety of goods and ser-
vices were represented (36 different product-service codes/federal sup-
ply classes). Most contracts were competed, and large and small busi-
nesses are evenly represented. All major types of contracts were repre-
sented.











T.G. Hawkins et al. Industrial Marketing Management xxx (xxxx) xxx-xxx
Table 4
Structure interview questionnaire – suppliers. Question, response summaries, and quotes Construct
Why are SPEs often inaccurate?
• “The natural inclination is that even though it to be over the
12 month period, they think about what has happened to
them recently and they tend to think about the bad things
more than the good things.”
• “Sometimes the report reflected some recent event rather
than the entire period.”
• “Inconsistency given by the human judgment factor. There is
too much subjectivity.” “It makes reports unreliable.”
• “In our experience [the agency] does not follow and blatantly
violates published guidelines for filling these out and uses
subjectivity to cover up for its own mistakes during project
execution.”
• “When a quarterly review with the customer comes back four
quarters in a row with an exceptional /very good write up its
very hard to accept a satisfactory at the end of the perfor-
mance period.”
• “With the [SPE], I know there's supposed to be some guide-
lines on, you know, what's acceptable or marginal, or what-
ever the guidelines are for performance, but it seems to be
not really strictly enforced as far as like there's more motion
on the ratings of the [SPE] with not a lot of justification.”
• “There are some shortfalls in it, it is definitely subjective. In
other words, most especially between different customers -
meaning that we have contracts with various contracting
agencies across the government. Some are a lot harder raters
than others.”
• “We have had reports over a year late.”
• “It is more—it is easier to commonly hear them, like ‘Oh,
[SPE] again.’ Again, you know, just with appraisals, ‘Oh, ap-
praisal time again.’ Yeah, they don't look forward to it and so
I think for them it is not a priority, it is not a means of mea-
suring.”
• “I have got one contract for sure that there is a monthly
scorecard. It is the—the government gives us a monthly look
at how we are doing and it basically very much you can tie it
right to the [SPE]. There is no fuzz on how things are going
throughout the year. So that is great.”
• “It is difficult to meet an ‘unknown’ requirement.”
• “Sometimes it is [in the contract], but they've gotten rid of
our incentive fee, so when we don't have an incentive fee
threshold and you don't write it into a contract or a perfor-
mance work statement, we're kind of shooting in the dark.”
“Just tell us what it takes—what you expect. If we want to
get an exceptional, what do you expect us to provide to you?
What performance?”
• “they're trying to hold us accountable for things that aren't
even in the contract.” “What they wanted and what they
bought were two different things. And so I'm getting dinged
on things that again I shouldn't be dinged on. It was not in
my contract to provide that level of service for talent.”
• “There are a few cases where it just seemed like somebody
had an agenda. Those never go over well.” Another informant
corroborated the existence of an agenda stating: “[The evalu-
ator] distorted the evaluation to suit his/her own agenda.”
• “The [SPE] process from the Contractor side can be brutal.
The Government personnel can abuse the system and mete
out punishment with little to no recourse. The Contractor al-
ways appears to be in the wrong as they are replying to accu-
sations.”
• “The justification for ratings received have been weak to min-
imal on the Government's part.”
• When asked whether the informant suspected that the gov-
ernment ever uses the SPE rating/evaluation as leverage, one
informant answered: “Yes, especially if they don't get along
with the contractor's managers.” Another informant stated:
“Absolutely, we have a client who we are helping now, be-
cause the government client is using this to reduce the re-
quests for equitable adjustment.” A third informant com-
mented: “that the [SPE] is used to change our position when
we negotiate issues and when tough positions are brought to
the forefront. ‘Well, you know, you only got this on your
CPARS, therefore, you need to work harder so you should
give us the—.’ So you are told to negotiate.” “I think it's used
as leverage every time we go to negotiate.” “It's implied. It's
just hideous. It's under the surface.” Another commented:
“Yeah, I'd say leverage, because I guess I don't know exactly
what gets them, but they definitely use them as an opportu-
nity to express their displeasure.” One informant put it this
way: “Some government program officers use the CPAR as a
means to maybe get our attention or to get maybe a separate
agenda, at least on the draft if not on the final version.”
When asked whether the government uses CPARs as leverage
or a threat, one informant commented: “Oh certain—you
know where we might have some thoughts that way, I don't
know that it is seen as an overall trend. There are probably
elements to it in some cases, but to me it is the exception. It is
certainly not the rule.” One informant alluded to using the
CPAR as punishment: “Customers are inconsistent. They are












































Highest education attained Career field
Degree Type Frequency Group Frequency
High School 12 Quality Assurance 3
Associates 8 Program Management 50
Bachelors 31 Contracting 18
Masters 74 Engineering 26








Type Frequency Type Frequency Percentage
Services 93 Competed 90 70.3




Business size Type of contract
Type Frequency Percentage Type Frequency
Small Business 63 49.2 Firm-Fixed
Price
77









4.4. Assessing non-response bias
Non-response bias was evaluated by comparing responses from early
and late respondents (Armstrong & Overton, 1977). A chi-square test
showed no difference across a key demographic, gender. Independent
samples t-tests explored any differences in constructs measured by con-
tinuous measures. These results suggest that the sample was not affected
by a non-response bias. Socially-desirable response bias is “the tendency
to give answers that make the respondent look good” (Paulhus, 1991,
p. 17). This natural tendency may obfuscate the truth; thus, SDR can
seriously jeopardize the validity of survey research (Nunnally, 1978;
Randall & Fernandez, 1991). Since this research entailed a sensitive,
ethical component (i.e., opportunism), anonymity was assured to re-
spondents as technique to reduce the respondent's motivation to respond
in a socially acceptable way.
4.5. Assessing common method variance
We assess and account for the presence of common method vari-
ance (CMV) using the correlational marker variable approach described
by Malhotra, Kim, and Patil (2006). CMV refers to systematic er-
ror variance resulting from the use of a single (common) method, po-
tentially inflating correlations between variables and obscuring the true
magnitude and, possibly, significance of statistical relationships. CMV
is of particular concern in cross-sectional survey research, where data
on multiple variables are collected from a single source. To partial
out this variance, and thus to guard against CMV-related biases in
our model-produced coefficient estimates, we utilize the second-small
est positive correlation (ρ < 0.01) among manifest variables to correct
observed correlations between all variables in our study. We then use
the resulting matrix of corrected correlations as input for confirmatory
factor analysis and structural equation modeling.
4.6. Confirmatory factor analysis
We assess the measurement properties of our latent constructs
through Confirmatory Factor Analysis (CFA) in R 3.6.1 (R Core Team,
2019), using the lavaan package (Rosseel, 2012). Estimation of the
measurement model was performed via maximum likelihood. While the
model-implied covariance matrix differs from that observed in the sam-
ple (Χ2(224) = 337.692, p < .01), the measurement model offers rea-
sonable fit to the sample data as assessed by the Comparative Fit Index
(CFI) value of 0.95, the Root Mean Square Error of Approximation (RM-
SEA) value of 0.06, the Standardized Root Mean Square Residual value
of 0.06 and the Tucker-Lewis Index value of 0.94, all of which fall within
common standards for acceptable fit (e.g., Kline, 2010) . We assess
the psychometric properties of multi-item scales through an examina-
tion of CFA estimation results and comparison to established criteria for
acceptability. Table 6 presents the item means and standard deviations,
as well as scale reliabilities and factor loadings. The composite reliabil-
ity (CR) of each scale exceeds the generally-accepted standard of 0.70
(Nunnally, 1978). Further, average variance extracted (AVE) for each
construct exceeds the 0.50 threshold (Fornell & Larcker, 1981), pro-
viding evidence for convergent validity. Lastly, AVE for each latent con-
struct was significantly greater than its squared correlation (Table 7),
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Table 6










SPE1 0.839 11.612 <
0.001
5.695 1.549
SPE2 0.896 12.909 <
0.001
5.832 1.376
SPE3 0.822 11.244 <
0.001
5.565 1.574






RD1 0.907 13.053 <
0.001
2.504 1.935
RD3 0.945 13.970 <
0.001
2.389 1.800






RJ2 0.903 12.863 <
0.001
5.855 1.222
RJ3 0.823 11.152 <
0.001
5.649 1.341






A4 0.877 12.444 <
0.001
6.107 1.191
A5 0.902 13.034 <
0.001
5.885 1.334
A7 0.823 11.262 <
0.001
6.031 1.301







FD1 0.686 8.293 <
0.001
2.481 1.931
FD2 0.764 9.530 <
0.001
2.298 1.851







SRD1 0.954 14.605 <
0.001
5.496 1.470
SRD2 0.973 15.116 <
0.001
5.496 1.366







L1 0.755 7.460 <
0.001
2.489 1.935






L3 0.776 8.180 <
0.001
1.557 1.117




The structural model (Fig. 1) was estimated using structural equa-
tion modeling (SEM), via maximum likelihood. In addition to estima-
tion of our hypothesized paths (as depicted within the figure), we esti
mated effects from a series of statistical controls on each endogenous
variable to guard against bias due to potential confounds. First, a control
variable (group), a dummy variable, accounts for variation in endoge-
nous variables that may be attributed to consolidation of data across
the two collections; responses collected through the latter survey were
coded with a value of one. Second, we control for respondents' percep-
tions of purchase criticality (criticality) to account for any variation in
SPE risk mitigation effectiveness, and mediating variables in the model,
that might be attributed to the importance perceptions by respondents
in the buying organization. To account for the nature of the relationship
and the nature of the performance under evaluation, we include con-
trols for contract duration (duration) and performance complexity (com-
plexity). As with criticality, we control for their effects on mediating vari-
ables in our model as well as on SPE risk mitigation effectiveness. Lastly,
we control for importance of the relationship to the firm by including a
measure of contract value (value), again controlling all mediators as well
as SPE risk mitigation effectiveness. We apply a natural-log transformation
to value, which is measured in dollars, to improve normality (i.e., to re-
duce undue leverage from those in the tail of the distribution) and inter-
pretability of coefficient estimates.
Fit indices for the structural model (Χ2(336) = 472.36, p < .01)
suggest adequate fit to the sample data (CFA = 0.94, RMSEA = 0.06,
SRMR = 0.08, TLI = 0.93). Standardized estimates of path coefficients
for hypothesized effects are presented within Table 8, along with their
corresponding z-values. Non-significant effects (p > .05) were estimated
from control variables group, duration, complexity and value on the en-
dogenous values. Effects from control variable criticality were also
non-significant on all endogenous variables, with the exceptions of Fear
of Supplier Dispute (Β = −0.184, z = −2.208, p = .027) and SPE risk
mitigation effectiveness (Β = 0.159, z = 2.088, p = .037). Returning to
the hypothesized relationships, total effects on SPE risk mitigation effec-
tiveness from mediated variables are presented within Table 9; to as-
sess mediation we construct confidence intervals using the Monte Carlo
method (Hayes & Scharkow, 2013; Preacher & Selig, 2012). The
structural model explained 41.26% of the variation in SPE risk mitigation
effectiveness, 51.79% of the variation in rating justification, 33.44% of the
variation in rating dissonance, 51.99% of the variation in perceived accu-
racy and 47.80% of the variation in fear of supplier dispute. The model of-
fered statistical support for each of the eight hypothesized relationships.
5.1. Effect of rating justification: a procedural rigor path
The path from sufficiency of requirement definition through per-
ceived accuracy and rating justification to SPE risk mitigation effec-
tiveness implicates the importance of procedural rigor and the contrac-
tual aspects of business, with a focus on thoroughly identifying require-
ments ex ante and on justified and pragmatic processing. Demonstrat-
ing stronger effect sizes than the path going through rating dissonance,
this path indicates the supremacy of setting and following through on
a shared, objective vision. Ex ante defining of requirements determines
the perceived accuracy of assessment, and the more accurate the assess-
ment, the stronger the outcome in terms of a justified rating and an effi-
cacious supplier performance evaluation – one that can lend confidence
of a future source selection team in its ability to assess the risk of ad-
verse selection.
5.2. Effect of rating dissonance
Rating dissonance decreased SPE risk mitigation effectiveness, which
was in turn increased by fear of supplier dispute. This path indicates
greater fear of a supplier's dispute to the SPE associated with greater rat-
ing dissonance. Tracing the relationships back further, fear of supplier
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Table 7
Correlations among latent constructs.
Correlations
1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.
1. SPE risk mitigation effectiveness 0.853
2. Rating dissonance −0.302 0.901
3. Rating justification 0.581 −0.184 0.856
4. Perceived accuracy 0.525 −0.276 0.664 0.815
5. Fear of supplier dispute −0.369 0.556 −0.297 −0.448 0.752
6. Sufficiency of requirement
Definition
0.565 −0.291 0.507 0.653 −0.378 0.899
7. Opportunism Attitude: Threat −0.117 0.075 −0.110 −0.320 0.384 −0.165 0.780
8. Opportunism Attitude: Debt −0.133 0.386 −0.145 −0.270 0.561 −0.265 0.434 0.758
Square root of average variance extracted (AVE) shown in bold on the diagonal.
Table 8
Results of structural model estimation.
Direct
effect Standardized coefficient z-value P(>|z|)
H1 Rating Dissonance → SPE Risk
Mitigation Effectiveness
−0.217 −2.641 0.008⁎⁎








H4 Perceived Accuracy → Fear of
Supplier Dispute
−0.288 −3.061 0.002⁎⁎








H7 Opportunism Attitude-Threat →
Perceived Accuracy
−0.196 −2.413 0.016⁎




⁎ p < .05.
⁎⁎ p < .01.
Table 9











Perceived Accuracy → SPE risk mitigation
effectiveness
0.400 0.290 0.522
Fear of Supplier Dispute → SPE risk
mitigation effectiveness
−0.121 −0.224 −0.033
Sufficiency of Requirement Definition →
SPE risk mitigation effectiveness
0.255 0.172 0.353
Opportunism Attitude-Threat → SPE risk
mitigation effectiveness
−0.079 −0.148 −0.016




Note. Confidence intervals constructed using Monte Carlo simulation with 5000 draws.
5.3. Differential effects of two types of opportunism
The factor analysis confirmed a valid distinction between two forms
of opportunism attitude – debt and threat – that are relevant in the
context of SPE. The mean values of items measuring opportunism atti
tude-debt are noticeably lower than those measuring opportunism at-
titude-threat, indicating that the threat is a more established practice.
Opportunism attitude-debt strongly increases the fear of a supplier dis-
pute. Opportunism attitude-threat decreases the perceived accuracy of
the SPE. Thus, the two forms of opportunism have differential effects
on the paths to SPE risk mitigation effectiveness, and they ultimately
weaken SPE risk mitigation effectiveness.
6. Discussion
The purpose of the research was to identify and explain the fac-
tors contributing to the risk-mitigating effectiveness of SPEs - the ex-
tent to which the supplier performance information collection and us-
age achieves the intended goal of mitigating the risk of adverse selec-
tion, and how SPE misuse undermines the effectiveness and efficiency of
SPEs. A mixed method of qualitative interviews of buyers and suppliers
followed by a survey of buy-side performance evaluators was employed
in order to build and test a model of antecedents to SPE risk mitigation
effectiveness with the following implications for research and practice.
6.1. Research implications
These empirical findings incriminate SPEs as vulnerable to unique
manifestations of opportunism. SPE misuse undermines the powerful
benefits of SPEs (see Table 10). Organizational behavior theory's ex-
planatory power appears paramount over agency theory with regard to
SPE risk mitigation effectiveness. This is extraordinary because organi-
zational theory represents only 7% of theories relied upon in supply
chain research (Defee et al., 2010). In a parallel to findings in organi-
zational behavior literature regarding the impact on employee behavior
of belief in the ratings portrayal (Ilgen et al., 1979), this research sug-
gests that in order for SPEs to be effective in mitigating the risk of future
adverse selection, consumers of the information (i.e., current suppliers
and future buyers) must believe the SPE is true. This renders SPE ac-
curacy and sufficient rating justifications into essential factors explain-
ing SPE risk mitigation effectiveness. This finding is consistent with pre-
vious research that found performance data instability to impede sup-
plier's reliance on the SPEs as a basis for improvements (Hald & Elle-
gaard, 2011). It also corresponds to a prior finding that buyers some-
times struggle to muster supporting information (i.e., the rating justifi-
cation) to support a SPE (Hald & Ellegaard, 2011). Therefore, this re-
search contributes to the stream of SPE research pertaining to functions
of SPEs by quantitatively confirming prior qualitative findings and fur-
ther by showing how – through accuracy and rating justification – SPEs
can become more effective.
With regard to agency theory, two dimensions of agency operated
simultaneously, and a third novel dimension emerged. First, the sup-
plier is considered an agent of the buyer in promulgating the buyer's
mission. Second, the buyer team is comprised of multiple agents to
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Table 10









Opportunistic behavior may divert activity to managing the
performance evaluations rather than the actual contracted work
activities. May result in reduced improvement activities, and
discontinuities if performance evaluators change. Erosion of







Opportunism diverts focus to non-operational and non-strategic
priorities. A critical supplier that is mismanaged may become
discouraged, not re-applying for future contract opportunities or
diminishing investments such as top talent and technology.
Inaccurate SPEs also mislead management attention, wasting





Unreliable or even questionable past performance data will be less
likely to be used, representing not just a lost opportunity to
improve supplier selection but also wasted resources. Where data
corrupted by opportunism is used, it will lead to inaccurate
supplier selection outcomes, with concomitant waste of resources






Lack of credible feedback mechanisms will erode supplier
investment and motivation to improve performance. Perceived
buyer susceptibility to opportunism may encourage suppliers to






Use of threats, coercion, or imposing of a sense of debt will re-
align supplier focus from performance expectations to managing




SPE opportunism renders valueless any historical performance
documentation. This represents a large waste of resources as well







Purchasing managers that rely on performance evaluation
information corrupted by SPE opportunism will misallocate




Companies aggregate purchasing power to gain influence over
suppliers through the power of incentives from bigger contracts as
well as more stability and efficiency. To the extent that company
priorities become disaggregated by opportunistic behavior at the
individual level, company policies lose their influence. Buying
company reputation suffers, which may discourage good suppliers
from wanting to engage in future business with that buyer, or





Inaccurate or untrustworthy feedback makes accurate
identification of continuous improvement opportunities difficult.
SPE opportunism shifts focus from process and service delivery
improvement to “managing the performance evaluator”.
tions, multiple agency relationships exist, and each can hold different in-
terests. The third unsuspected dimension of agency pertains to the pro-
gram (i.e., the purchased requirement such as a construction project or
complex system). In some cases, both performance evaluators and sup-
plier employees could begin to identify more with the program than
with their employers. In other words, sometimes what is advantageous
for the program can supersede what is advantageous for either the buyer
team or the supplier. This explains the halo effect afforded a supplier
who fails in one instance of performance, yet the evaluator does not
mention the failure in the SPE because of reluctance to taint the pro-
gram or the supplier's chance for future business.
This research finds two distinct types of attitudes toward oppor-
tunism in the context of SPE effectiveness, threat and debt. Buyers some-
times believe it is acceptable to engage in SPE misuse by weaponiz-
ing the SPE as leverage to reap concessions from suppli
ers. Consistent with prior research (Schmitz & Platts, 2004), buyers
may do so by threatening a lower rating in exchange for a desired action.
A novel finding is that buyers may also reap concessions by imposing a
debt by “gifting” a more positive SPE than earned or documented. In ei-
ther case, SPE misuse by the performance evaluator diminishes SPE ac-
curacy and, paradoxically, harms the employer by compromising the or-
ganization's ability to avoid poor suppliers in the future. These findings,
therefore, contribute to the SPE stream of literature pertaining to out-
comes by illuminating a temporal dimension – SPE misuse by one em-
ployee serving as supplier performance evaluator (current agent) could
inhibit the effectiveness of another employee serving on a source selec-
tion team (future agent).
Recent research finds that judgments of whether a particular act con-
stitutes opportunism are subjective, dependent on the type of behavior,
type of exchange, and personality (Arikan, 2018). Victims are more
likely to perceive an act as opportunistic than are perpetrators. This may
explain why some performance evaluators may hold an attitude that
threatening a supplier is justifiable. It may also explain why some per-
formance evaluators believe it acceptable to put suppliers in debt of re-
paying favors of positive SPEs. Performance evaluators simply do not
perceive these behaviors as SPE misuse.
The findings from this research seem to confirm other aspects of
SPE use from prior research. For example, Hald and Ellegaard (2011)
found that buyers changed ratings based on reactions from suppliers im-
plying that: (1) ratings were inaccurate and (2) buyers are concerned
about supplier reactions. Similarly, this research found that SPE inaccu-
racy increases the fear of a supplier dispute to the ratings. The fear of
a dispute creates dissonance among the buyer's evaluation team, which,
in turn, decreases the risk mitigating effectiveness of SPEs. The implica-
tion is that performance evaluators often fail to correctly perceive SPE
misuse even though SPE misuse propagates numerous negative conse-
quences that undermine SPE effectiveness.
6.2. Practical implications
Rating justification had the strongest effect on SPE risk mitigation
effectiveness. Thus, for those seeking to increase SPE risk mitigation
effectiveness, efforts should be made to more thoroughly justify rat-
ings—which implies an important effect from minimizing SPE misuse.
This research offers insights as to how to improve rating justifications.
First, buying organizations can address the effort required to justify a
SPE. This can be done by making more time available to evaluators to
conduct SPEs by hiring more evaluators, by dedicating evaluators to the
task of SPE, or by reducing evaluators' non-SPE duties.
Some evidence suggests that buying organizations can improve rat-
ing justifications by sufficiently defining rating definitions. Doing so
may require tailoring ratings and their definitions to the particular
goods or services being procured rather than using common, generic def-
initions. Sourcing teams should further define performance criteria, how
each will be measured, and develop thresholds for each that unambigu-
ously lead to the specific performance ratings. These performance crite-
ria and rating definitions should be defined in the request for proposals
and requirements documents, and then set in the resulting contract in
order for the supplier to more likely believe and accept the ratings as
legitimate.
For the practicing manager, the model illustrates the importance of
early steps in the process to create inputs to the rating system that are
clearly defined. Buyers are notorious for omitting details and includ-
ing ambiguous information. Greater perceived accuracy results when
the buyer takes the time to clearly identify and communicate needs,
and perceived accuracy, to an important extent, justifies supplier perfor-
mance ratings.
Some performance evaluators believe that misuse of SPE ratings as
leverage is acceptable—either (or both) as a threat to a supplier dur-
ing performance and prior to a SPE or as a means to extract conces-
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ing. The survey data from performance evaluators was corroborated by
testimonies from suppliers. Such an attitude toward opportunism was
found to lower SPE accuracy. Since perceived accuracy was found to be
a central construct leading to SPE risk mitigation effectiveness, SPE mis-
use as leverage should be explicitly addressed in hiring, training, and
procurement policy.
Since the level of opportunism attitude-debt is lower than that of
opportunism attitude-threat, there appears to be a greater acceptance
among buyers of using the SPE as a threat for concessions from the sup-
plier, perhaps because that, over time, the performance evaluator has
learned that they can get what they want from suppliers. Further, the
prevalence of a threat tactic versus a debt tactic suggests that buyers are
more reluctant to use an overly generous SPE to create an obligation to
return a favor.
6.3. Study limitations
Although similar to other studies of public procurement, the re-
sponse rate is low calling into question the generalizability of the re-
sults. The response may have been subdued by several factors. First, past
performance data is considered sensitive and proprietary information;
some prospective respondents may have been uncomfortable participat-
ing. Furthermore, government agencies have discouraged the participa-
tion in surveys via cumbersome approvals. Another contributing factor
may have been the data breach by the Office of Personnel Management
involving the loss of sensitive information of 21 million government em-
ployees (Nelson & Tau, 2015). Additionally, survey solicitations via
email originating outside of the government domain may be flagged as
junk mail or spam. Finally, survey length was a likely culprit. Low re-
sponse rate is not uncommon in business research. Melnyk, Page, Wu,
and Burns (2012) revealed a steady decline of 1% annually since 2002.
Five top journals reported low-end survey response rates ranging from
3% to 8%. Another limitation could include self-selection bias. Those re-
spondents to the survey who were highly dissatisfied with the SPE policy
or system could have been more inclined to respond to the survey. Ab-
sent information about non-respondents, non-response bias could only
be inferred by comparing early to late respondents.
6.4. Future research directions
The trade-off of a current gain in supplier performance versus a fu-
ture risk reduction in adverse selection raises an interesting research
question. Researchers could explore what level of prospective gain will
prompt an evaluator to make such a tradeoff and render the threat,
and, conversely, what level of gain would be insufficient to warrant a
threat? Future research could also explore the origins of opportunism
attitudes that drive SPE misuse, particularly the debt form. Specifically,
how much of the attitude that creating indebtedness to serve as leverage
is an acceptable practice is held by the performance evaluator or by his
or her supervisor (i.e., the reviewing official)? This answer would sug-
gest to an ethically-minded organization the source in order to mitigate
or eliminate the practice. Future research could also bolster our initial
findings by examining actual acts of opportunism rather than attitudes.
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Appendix A. Measurement scale
Construct Scale Items a
SPE risk mitigation effectiveness
SPE1: This CPAR will help inform evaluators about this contractor's performance
risk in a future source selection evaluation.
SPE2: If future source selection evaluators read this SPE, they can assess the risk of
dealing with this contractor.
SPE3: This CPAR will reduce future source selection evaluators' uncertainty about
this firm's likelihood of performing similar work well.
SPE6: With this SPE, future source selection evaluators can be confident in their
assessment of the risk of this contractor successfully performing on a similar future
contract.
Rating dissonance
RD1: Between myself, the “Reviewing Official,” and other performance evaluators,
there was some disagreement on at least one SPE rating.
RD2: Significant effort was required to deliberate with others as to what rating(s)
to assign.
RD4: The government team had difficulty reaching consensus on the ratings or
narrative justification.
Rating justification
RJ2: The rationale for the assigned SPE rating was thoroughly documented.
RJ3: An inspector general would conclude that the SPE rating was sufficiently ex-
plained.
RJ5: Anyone who reads this SPE will understand the ratings based on the support-
ing information in the report.
Perceived accuracy
A4: The government accurately measured the contractor's performance level.
A5: The government consistently measured the contractor's performance level.
A7: All of the assessed ratings could be traced back to records of contractor perfor-
mance.
A9: Had ten other qualified people completed this SPE, each would have arrived at
the exact same ratings.
Fear of supplier dispute
FD1: If I reported the contractor's performance accurately, the contractor would
have disputed/rebutted the rating(s).
FD2: While completing the SPE, at least one member of the government team was
concerned that the contractor might dispute the assigned rating.
FD4: To report the ratings that the contractor actually deserved would have con-
sumed too much time responding to the contractor's rebuttal.
Sufficiency of requirement definition
SRD1: The requirement was very well defined in the contract/task order/delivery.
SRD2: The contract/task order/delivery order (including the statement of work,
performance work statement, specification, drawings, etc.) defined the requirement
very well.
SRD4: There were no ambiguities in the definition of the requirement (including
the statement of work, performance work statement, specification, drawings, etc.).
Opportunism attitude-threat
OT1: It is ok for the Government to threaten the contractor with a lower SPE rat-
ing.
OT2: It is ok for the Government to use the SPE as bargaining leverage with the
contractor.
Opportunism attitude-debt
OD3: If we give the contractor a SPE that is better than what they deserve, the
contractor should reciprocate in some way.
OD4: Leverage can be gained by providing the contractor an overly favorable SPE.
a All responses were obtained using 7-point Likert-type scales.
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